Yes. Just not in the way you think.

A CVN is a moving coffin in the same way that clothes are a bendy-stretchy coffin, a car is a rolling coffin, SSNs are underwater coffins, and coffins are very coffin-y coffins.

Anything can be a coffin if you die in it. While CVNs do happen to be very sturdily built (you've gotta be, not just to handle \~20t aircraft planting themselves on top of them at a concerning rate of speed; but to even build a ship that large, with that many compartments, bulkheads, yadah yadah, there has to be an awful lot of "meat" within it), and even someone like me on the more pessimistic end of the spectrum wouldn't sensibly insist a single AShBM hit (or 2, or even 3) would leave Culinary Specialist Rose hanging onto the toilet that Hull Technician Jack was fixing, gazing through tears at his relieved, peaceful expression slipping beneath the ways.

Time to learn you bros a thing or two about Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), how most people don't know what they're talking about when discussing it, how CSGs aren't magical PEZ dispensers for sorties, and how they're also not vulnerable in the way you might think in dynamic engagements. Strap in bros... I'm heavily intoxicated, and I just know this is gonna be a long one.

First, let's get this out of the way. A CVN absolutely can be sunk, and all it takes are enough holes punched in the right spots. It can be made easier if poor damage control gets thrown in to the equation, or if those holes are poked in an especially sensitive spot. However, it's simply imprudent to do so in most circumstances.

Remember, ASuW strikes aren't necessarily about sinking ships, they're about degrading or denying the capabilities an enemy's surface force can bring to the table. To that end, simply mission killing a CVN - that is, preventing launch or recovery of aircraft - produces nearly equivalent effects, and is a far more easily-achieved end state. A big hole punched through the flight deck, down through the hangar, blowing it's load all over the munitions, aircraft, and personnel present is most likely going to shut down flight ops until repairs can be made (barring some seriously good luck aboard the CVN). In the case of a WESTPAC tussle, it's more than likely that the conflict will have concluded by the time a stricken CVN could be brought back online, making it as good as sunk.

With this in mind, I'm sure you can see why the PLA, who have constructed their entire anti-shipping complex around the concept of denying US naval forces either certain capabilities outright, or at least the desired conditions to exercise those capabilities to their full effect, would prosecute CSG targets with salvos weaponeered, generated, and employed to mission-kill, rather than to necessarily sink/"destroy" them.

This alone greatly reduces the probability of a CVN becoming a "coffin" out of the gate, especially when compared to Aircraft Carriers of years and threat environments past (where a "sunk" CV was much more likely than simply a damaged one compared to nowadays). Another factor to keep in mind is that, well, a CSG puts a whole lot of effort into not just surviving being shot, but not getting shot at in the first place.

I'm not going to parrot the dumb fucking copypasta that I've seen a couple times lately, going something like

A Carrier Strike Group is capable of traveling 700 nautical miles in only 24 hours, making them nearly impossible to find and keep track of in something as large as the Pacific Fucking Ocean!!!!11!!!

because I think it's a really goofy argument to make. Sure, yes, 30 knots is a cool pace to make by anyone's standards, but platitudes like the quote above both oversell how mobile, survivable, and impactful CVNs are, and simultaneously don't do justice to the real implications of a respectably mobile, nuclear powered asset, able to employ a CVW's worth of very capable multirole aircraft, and doing so at a tempo which potentially eeks out triple digit sortie volumes per 24 hours.

Firstly, I think it's important to mention that one of the hallmark characteristics of a WESTPAC clash is that it's... well.... in the Western Pacific. Most folks on here are of the armchair variety, and don't have a super great grasp on naval logistics; but suffice to say, it takes a large amount of effort to sustain naval forces far from home. To operate in the 7FLT AOR the way we do, we rely extensively on the local infrastructure and our partner nations, not to mention a permissive, peacetime operating environment. We don't get that kind of luxury in a major WESTPAC naval conflict. With basing and port infrastructure out to Guam either inoperable, destroyed, or infeasible to utilize (for instance, if theoretically left intact, Sasebo could serve as a port of call for USN vessels; but good luck getting there and surviving the replenishment lol), we'll be working with replenishment SLOCs many multiple times the length of peacetime routes. I won't go over our auxiliary force in too much detail, nor the rabbit hole of expeditionary naval logistics (those are a whole different topic, and you see how long this alone got); but we simply don't have the T-AOEs and T-AOs to sustain large naval forces engaged in high intensity (and therefore, wartime operational tempo) naval strike operations if we're sending auxiliaries back and forth from Pearl or Australia every time to supply them.

For typical 1CVN/1CG/3DDG CSG configurations, peacetime sustainment calls for an UNREP visit from auxiliary-chan a minimum of once per week, and typical real world tempos are once every \~3-5 days to keep fuel and stores from getting lower than comfortable. At a wartime operational tempo (\~60-90 "pulse" strike sorties or \~110 to maaaybe 120 cyclic DCA-focused sorties per day) while making 22kts, you'll be looking for a replenishment every \~3 days, where 4 day gaps are workable, but never above 5 if you can help it. This is already taxing for auxiliary vessels to feed, but at 30kts, Burkes lose a LOT of their endurance, and UNREPs every 36-48 hours can become a necessity - especially if the CVN is conducting the types of cyclic operations on a 24h deck that can push \~120 sorties/24h. As I'm sure you can imagine, this makes such 30kt "sprinting" not an especially prudent way of operating. Is it technically possible? Sure. Is it sensible, sustainable, or practical to push for those prestige numbers in a real conflict? Not so much.

Further, and this is something I have to communicate with frustrating frequency, a CSG doesn't just spawn in a random part of the ocean to then be discovered like an evasive needle in a haystack. It has a homeport, it deploys from that homeport, travels to a relevant region along roughly the most expedient route - sometimes with one or more port of call along the way, which can have their locations, timing, and course obfuscated until near arrival, but not hidden entirely; or it may deviate due to other factors, but to a mostly negligible degree when dealing with WESTPAC distances (at 10kts of wind, to make 30kts over deck with a margin, a CVN at 25kts taking 20 minutes to launch aircraft during a launch cycle may deviate a little over 8 nautical miles from the shortest homeport-destination geodesic line) - and once in theater, a CSG operates in regions, environments, and in an overall manner that maximizes effects generated on an adversary through the employment of its CVW. As a result, without getting into the quite extensive PLA maritime ISTAR complex of space-based, aerial, surface, land, subsurface, and seafloor sensors, I'll just say that, out past the 2nd island chain, it's reasonable to assume CSGs are tracked mostly persistently these days, with occasional gaps in space-based sensor coverage resulting in manageable areas of uncertainty, within which, it's feasible and probable to re-establish a fix during successive passes. Closer towards the PRC's shores, the myriad of other sensor systems turn that mostly-persistent track into a pretty much continuous one, and which - during peacetime - can likely maintain a cue-quality track for the majority of the time (the benefits of the SSF's data fusion centers, of which I'm jealous, and its many input vectors); and which - in wartime - could, depending on a myriad of factors, potentially require a surge of airborne sensor platforms and D(?)CA presence, or employment of more creative prompt cueing aids, such as WZ-8 (assuming targeting information isn't available from sensors in other domains, which it likely would be for a sizable portion of any given timeframe).

Disrupting PLA AShBM/AShCM employment left of launch is absolutely a viable CONOP, but it's not a silver bullet. Doing so via "going fast as fuck boiiii" is also absolutely useful but again, it's not really decisive in the way it's made out.

The ways CSGs can disrupt kill-chains are a little more esoteric than just "bro turn left a bit and go fast, it's a big ocean :)" and aren't necessarily obvious if you're newer to this subject matter. Firstly, target mobility can complicate subsonic munition employment, because target area of uncertainty (TAOU) numbers grow much larger during those longer-duration, subsonic transits when compared to comparatively shorter transits by more prompt weapons systems. This, in turn, requires launch units employing subsonic, non-retargetable munitions (think like, YJ-83s and crap) to launch from shorter standoffs in order to keep time on target TAOU within an acceptable limit, which for both surface warships and aircraft, increases their vulnerability to the CSG's own airpower. Keeping the pace up also reduces the CSG's vulnerability to subsurface threats, and makes intercept possible only in much shallower "cones" along the CSG's path of travel, letting rotary wing (or fixed wing, if available/feasible, i.e. MPAs) assets concentrate their ASW effort. This same principle applies to other surface formations as well, in that a PLAN SAG attempting to close to YJ-18 employment range will have a hard time doing so if the CSG is keeping its distance, and generating anti-shipping sorties repeatedly, given that it can conduct ASuW operations at a greater standoff than surface warships.

This alone is enough to render CSGs out past the first island chain (10-8-3-5 jassm-er strike ops CONEMP comes to mind) mostly out of surface combatant reach, unless they break out of the 1IC, into the bathymetric regime in which COMSUBPAC starts getting really really scary. As PLAN ASW continues to improve (it's already getting quite competent, and though not all of their kit is as modern as it ought to be, they still have a diverse and extensive inventory of subsurface threat detection which can't be ignored), and their own advanced SSNs start coming online (09V, most obviously), we'll see at-scale PLAN expeditionary operations into the open Pacific become more practical; but for now, it's still a pretty big gamble.

When defending aerial threats, some advantages can be gleaned by this mobility as well. To highlight a few of them, let's run through a quick and dirty PLANAF ASuW targeting, mission planning, tasking, and execution cycle for a, say, 1CVN+1CG+4DDG CSG that has recently arrived in-theater as the first of the O-FRP surge CSGs 4-8 weeks into the war.

Even if we assume there are PLANAF H-6Js armed, fueled, and with crews at drop-of-a-hat level alert status/readiness to receive and execute ASuW mission tasking, they can't, don't, and won't just take off and fly towards the nearest CSG without lots of crap done behind the scenes before a single aircraft leaves the ground.

As the CSG track is continuously maintained and updated, the CMC Joint Operations Command Center, which exercises national-level joint strategic command, and to which the Theater Command Joint Operations Command Centers are subordinate, would probably take a heavier share of the reigns on a mission as complicated as (promptly) dynamically prosecuting a target on the level of strategic importance as a CSG, which would help alleviate pressure from the Theater Command Joint Operations Command Center's Air Operations Group Command Department (responsible for all PLAAF and PLANAF aviation under the Theater Command's OPCON, and it usually just gets abbreviated to AOGC Department, since TC and JOCC, and even sometimes the word "department" are implied and lengthy lmao), who are likely up to their neck in tasks as is, simply due to the nature of high intensity air/naval ops. As an important sidenote, apart from traditional air tasking cycles, the PLA joint air command system can asynchronously develop and assign taskings for time-critical, high priority, or other missions/campaigns as needed, with this information being shared through the joint C2 system as it is relevant.

Per the principles of Target Centric Warfare, an operational system tailored to the campaign at hand (Joint Firepower Strike Against The Enemy's Strategic Maritime Group) would likely be stood up, would be headed by CMC JSD/JOCC Joint Strategic Commanders, who would be responsible for directing and overseeing the the major target development tasks, target vulnerability analysis (everything from DCA to SM-6 to SM-2 to ESSM to SLQ-32 to Nulkas and chaff to Phalanx to armor protection), meteorological impact analysis, electromagnetic effects analysis, and other "Target Profile" data. CMC JSD/JOCC personnel would likely be responsible for the execution of those tasks in a prompt, accurate manner.

This is a good time to note that the PLA has a *fantastic* joint command and control apparatus, and the PLASSF's information distribution and data fusion centers provide PLA planners with a wealth of information and situational awareness. To handle the sheer *volume* of information PLAbros are presented with nowadays, there's been extensive application of big data, AI/ML shit, and an overall "Intelligentization" of the "Information Support Subsystem" that assists in targeting, assessment, coordination, and a myriad of other tasks. Creating a rapidly responsive, highly functional, extensive set of realtime information sharing framework, in conjunction with a sensor, shooter, and unit agnostic targeting and fires employment system have rendered the PLA uniquely capable of rapid planning and tasking cycles, rapidly redeveloping joint integrated operational plans, and - on the whole, honestly - of exercising command and control in an extremely efficient manner at a pace we're playing catch up to in some respects (JADC2 will get us back where we need to be, hopefully lol).

Anyhow, my jealousy aside, after those target metacharacteristics were entered manually or were automatically piped in where already available, those JSD/JOCC personnel would use the aforementioned decision making aids to rapidly perform weaponeering and employment profile optimization. This whole process from initiation to infinitive, anonymous salvo profile can take anywhere from 30 minutes to many many hours depending on the target set (most principally its size), the complexity of the operational environment, the scope of the planning (total-force, theater-command, branch unit, tactical formation, etc.), and much more, but being a single-target mission, I'd wager it'd land closer to the low end of the spectrum.

In conjunction with personnel from relevant theater command AOGC departments, the weaponeered salvo's munitions are assigned to shooters (invariably H-6s in this instance), from their Theater Command (Naval) Air Forces, and backup airframes and force compositions are nailed down in the event of a missed sortie (be it due to maintenance, crew factors, or something else). Following allocation, the actual mission planning, coordination, etc. is initiated, where PLP (Preferred Launch Point) locations are established for each sortie - relative to the configuration and location of the target CSG at any given time, flight groups are assigned a tentative time on target to shoot for (no pun intended), route planning is conducted, including rendezvous times, nominal rendezvous locations (to minimize fuel waste aboard aircraft during loitering and aggregation periods), and alternate/contingency/emergency plans are put in place should certain elements fall through.

With aircraft not at an alert state on the ground, nor orbiting in a holding area while available for more rapid air interdiction tasking, the targeting, mission planning, and tasking process can take hours, or can end up as a continuous "cat and mouse" game where once the targeting process is complete, shooters are kept available and on station behind the FLOC with munitions on pylons, but the CSG never quite hangs out close enough for long enough to conduct anti-shipping strikes even with those "on station" aircraft.

Worth mentioning by the way is just how damn noisy modern command and control can be. While the PLA actually been pretty clever in their EMCON efforts, it's likely that large scale dynamic anti-shipping missions would generate at least some noticeable comms traffic increases, which would perk our ears up a bit, and in instances where H-6s require arming, fueling, crew briefings, etc. (all of which can easily take a ballpark 6+ hours, which is fast by most standards, owing to the PLA's - again - well developed C4I infrastructure, but still a meaningful stretch of time), NTM sources (optical/sar space-based sensors are the obvious candidate) may detect preparation of those airframes for sorties, which would be a big red flag for the CSG to put some buffer between it and the mainland, and to generate some serious DCA presence in the process. Other means of "early EARLY" warning include HUMINT sources reporting seeing/hearing H-6 takeoffs (:P), major changes in behavior of PLAN surface warships, tanker sorties (we'll get into that), and other "precursor"/"bellwether" signs/events - all of which can be exploited (and counter-exploited, but CI is another discussion entirely).

Either way, at this point - with the actual strike mission planned, sorties and munitions allocated, and enough H-6Js to succeed in the task (just for demonstrative purpose lol), the flyout and transit aren't at light speed either. We'll say our notional H-6Js (Pro Max) are out of Eastern Theater Command's Changzhou AB, northwest of Shanghai. If we assume that aerial anti-shipping fires alone is sufficient to prosecute the targeted CSG, it puts outer employment ranges out to \~1400nm (\~2500km) out to sea with 4x YJ-12s per airframe. With YJ-12s classed as 400km class munitions, and transit speeds of \~Mach 3-4 @ 20km (some folks say it gets up to 40km during the transit phase, but I personally have my doubts, and I consider the 17-23km altitude band a little more sensible, but I'm willing and able to be corrected here) to achieve them, PLP (Preferred Launch Point) selection would likely be anywhere from a \~360-390km (195-210nm) standoff along a terminal attack axis exposing the munition to the smallest number of - and along least preferable engagement profiles for - missile-defenses in the CSG. Think like, if you drew a bunch of engagement range circles, you'd want to minimize the number that you flew through, and try to get as far off frontal-aspect as possible while transiting unavoidable ones. The extra kinematic margin left in (on top of that provided by the real Rmax, which... lol there'll be enough) will be expended during midcourse corrections, terminal maneuvers, and through the CSG's own movement away from us.

For a CSG target at a standoff of \~1000nm (\~1850km), once the strike package has generated its sorties and gotten aggregated (we'll call it a 30 minute process for all shooter/escort airframes), following a completely off-the-wall tier arbitrary 3 hour long planning, tasking briefing, and initiation (FoxThreeForDale, Tailhook91, any other airwing guys... feel free to furrow your brows - you're in the right to do so :P). We'll give a freebie ELINT win to the USN though, which you're free to make up whatever specific mechanism by which it happens on your own (bad EMCON, some sussy cyber vuln, up to you, it's just illustrative), but we'll suppose it affords the USN knowledge that something is going on, and we'll - for ease of maths - just say this knowledge was gained around 30 mins into the planning phase.

With 3 hours of total notice so far, the CSG could have pulled back 75-90nm by this point. This is hardly decisive by any stretch, but it does matter. We'll get more into the "why" it matters in a bit.

As the H-6s make their way out over the Pacific, OCA sorties (J-16s and J-20s are best suited) generated to support the strike will likely have gotten out ahead of the H-6s. Other participating assets would likely be 1x AEW airframe (KJ-500) to provide the obvious early warning, but also command and control, as well to potentially cue PL-15 shots should the situation behoove it, at least 1, but likely no more than 2 dadui of escort EW aircraft (think J-16D), and a variable number of AAR platforms for the OCA/EW components (OCA at this distance is a bit beyond the J-16s combat radius, and while this might not be the case for the J-20, when factoring in flyout, rendezvous, and forming up with the strike package, potential time in combat, reserve fuel, etc. a top-off is still prudent).

All of these supporting elements would also have to have been planned, coordinated, and tasked, during the mission planning phase, seeing as how it's a strike mission flown into contested airspace. Having to perform mission planning for, get availability from, and task these additional sorties would be yet another potentially delaying factor, which for brevity's sake, I'm not going to bother too much with. In terms of how requirements would be computed and mission planning executed for them, it would involve looking at the known (if any) DCA presence kept airborne by the CSG, whether recent air ops would have contributed to reduced airframe availability for interception missions (a max-standoff, deck load JASSM-ER strike mission having just recovered would... likely reduce the number of aircraft capable of going up and defending the CSG for a while), conservatively estimating (i.e. giving the adversary their best scenario, and you your worst) the "interception" window between the strike package being detected and munition employment - during which the CSG can generate sorties to interdict the strike package - and then basing OCA sortie allotments off of that expected DCA presence at expected air combat exchange ratios (using the conservative/unfavorable end of any ranges of possibilities, just as best practice).

Those OCA sorties then require tanker planning and tasking dependent on the number of airframes, mission duration, attrition/availability mitigation, and the number of AAR airframes derived from those factors are then tasked with certain mission profiles (go to [x.xx, x.xx] and orbit, tail the strike package until [x:yy] at which point J-16s will top off and you can go home, etc.) depending on the strike mission's various traits.

NOTE: Planning and constructing a strike package is, itself, a fairly complex endeavor with a large amount of input factors to consider, and it's imperative to understand the manner by which all of those factors interact in the real world. Even something as simple as the weather, or an incorrect assessment of enemy defensive capabilities can turn a poorly constructed strike package into a well constructed Martin-Baker advertisement. We're not gonna go over all of it, since this is already a prodigiously long drunken ramble, soooooo anyone else who's actually familiar with this crap's exact nature and process, bear with me as I oversimplify the shit out of it.

To make it less convoluted, we're just assuming that somehow all of these elements come from the same facility, and that they don't have to stagger/schedule their takeoff order/times. In actuality, airfields farther inland would likely start generating mission sorties before those closer to the coast (and therefore the target); and package elements responsible for "forward" tasks (J-20s in an OCA role for instance) would get going before other aircraft in the package serving roles farther to the rear (J-16Ds, as an example) if they both were based at the same facility. By doing so, a minimum amount of fuel wasted while forming up, package elements end up where they're supposed to be as swiftly and efficiently as possible, and the time between the start of mission execution and first munition expenditure is kept to a minimum. It also means that the ELINT collected and exploited during the mission planning phase would give more time to put distance and DCA between the CSG and the PRC, since for a fixed amount of warning during the planning phase, the farther inland the inland-most airframes sortie from, compared to how far inland the last sortie's airframe gets airborne from (and more usefully, the longer duration between the first sortie generated and the last), the greater the "aggregation penalty" (it has a few names, I just like that one) a mission incurs compared to if the assets had all been departing from the forward-most airfield.

Anyhow, as we move on to the transit phase, it has already been 3.5+ hours since the prosecution process began (quite generous to the PLA), and aircraft are only now actually formed up and en-route. Again, I really want to stress, this is a looooowball for a dynamic CSG target operating at this kind of standoff, and gives a few freebies to the PLA (while also, in fairness, ignoring operational constraints that would inhibit the USN as well) - so just a reminder that I'm using ballpark figures here to highlight less well known operational factors in anti-shipping operations , not going off of ultra in-depth granularly analyzed quant data lol.

Anyhow, At a 450 knot transit speed, with the CSG notionally backing off at 30kts along a heading directly away from the strike package (which we're giving a straight shot, but which in reality would likely "elbow" around Okinawa, Taiwan, or other natural barriers/higher threat regions), with 1090nm (\~2020km) to the CSG, and \~875nm (\~1620km) to the PLP, that'll get us a dynamic ΔTfplp (elapsed time from the package's final member forming [aka end of aggregation, and the start of the transit] to the arrival of the shooters at the final PLP) of around 2 hours, during which the CSG has backed off another 50-60nm. Again, not a game changer, but this is in a scenario with a generous, to put it lightly, amount of deus-ex-haste blessing laid upon the PLA. When working with real world mission planning and execution timeframes - especially if operational factors throw a wrench into anything - that lead-time can absolutely result in hundreds of nautical miles of additional "buffer" created by a CSG between the start of mission planning, and the time at which a notional first weapon is employed.

Further, while these numbers are - strictly - something that can be overcome by airpower and ballistic missile forces if things go well for the PLA, the same can't be said for surface combatants. As the CSG doubles back, any PLAN surface formations attempting to close with and employ their own ASuW suite against it will be unable to meaningfully do so. As a result, surface vessels are not a reliable salvo provider for Air+Surface AShM strikes against O-FRP CSGs keeping their distance from the get-go.

This - as I'm sure you can imagine - results in airpower being tasked with generating the requisite fires bandwidth to achieve a salvo's desired effects; and makes dynamic, overwhelming anti shipping salvos in general a far greater logistical effort compared to deliberate targeting and prosecution. These constraints might not make the CSG "unkillable" by any means, but they absolutely impose a "virtual attrition" on the PLA, reducing the pace and scope of the PLA's ASuW operations, and ballooning the material/opportunity costs of such strike missions in the process.

A follow on effect of this is that for PLAN surface formations to be reliable fires providers at all, they must either generate them as part of their own anti-shipping salvos, and be willing to accept the TAOU cost imposed by subsonic (\~650kt cruise in YJ-18's case, we'll leave surface-launched YJ-12/YJ-83s out of this since blue water SAGs are likely 055/052Ds) munitions employed near the edges of their maximum range of a little under 300nm. This "near maximum range" constraint is in order to keep as close to the mainland as is feasible, a salvo employed at a feasible 250nm range against a CSG at even its 800nm pivot point (in 10-8-3-5 strike ops) would require the SAG to make an excursion beyond the 1st island chain - really pushing the limits of land-based air cover, and at a proximity to the CSG where it is all but guaranteed to be a known and mitigated threat, making the prospect of closing to such a knife-fighting range, but the CSG neither conducting a little LRASM-sponsored ASuW of their own, or simply using that mobility to keep the SAG at arms length... somewhat unlikely.

In the case of Ballistic Missiles, a lot of the same stuff applies here. It's not so much that a CVN can beat a Ballistic Missile in a race or anything, it's that - due to the inherent difficulties in conducting complex, dynamic, joint anti-shipping operations, there are considerable amount of "back-end" hangups upon which a CSG can potentially leave a DF-26 salvo hanging. Even after the planning and munition allocation to the PLA RF Brigade(s), if their TELs aren't deployed, they have to get everyone to come a-running, run a brief check on the munitions (if they're mated - and mated with the right warhead, which they can't 100% be guaranteed to be at all times, get all the vehicles ready and started up, form up and depart their base, head to wherever it is they plan to launch from (sometimes practically out back behind the base, other times launch areas can be a not inconsiderable drive), deploy the (many) vehicles in a manner conducive to launch operations, receive mission data and upload it to the missiles, allow the missile's guidance system to align (usually takes at least a few minutes), verify intent to fire for super duper suresies, then the munition get employed. From "wanting to shoot" to actually shooting can easily take upwards of an hour, there can be disruptions to space-based systems as war goes on (I'm not really referring to "outset of hostilities" operations in this post, since yeah no whatever CVN is in 7FLT's AOR, especially if they're close to the PRC's mainland, they're toast lol) which can drive that number up higher, and TAOU numbers even during the short transit times enjoyed by AShBMs can be high enough to require "spreads" of launch DMPIs in order to be confident enough RVs will acquire the CVN.

Hope ya learned something. I've been typing so long I think I'm hungover.

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Pub: 27 Aug 2022 13:09 UTC
Views: 1156