The Written Exception Question in Nevin Shetty's Appellate Brief
A written exception provision appears at several stages of Nevin Shetty's case, but the July 31, 2026 appellate brief gives it a particular focus. Counsel argues that the prosecution treated an asserted failure to put an exception in writing as a reason to set aside the policy's delegation of authority. The appeal asks whether that approach supplied the proof necessary to establish wire fraud.
The issue deserves more than a shorthand answer. A writing requirement can serve a real governance purpose, and failure to satisfy it can matter. At the same time, the relationship between a documentation requirement and a federal criminal offense needs to be established through the charged elements. Shetty's lawyers argue that the prosecution did not adequately make that connection.
Begin with the provision's actual function
Fabric's March 2022 policy includes a provision for a written exception to quantitative guidelines, approved by the COO or CFO in the circumstances described. It appears alongside investment objectives, approved instruments and management responsibilities. The document therefore combines constraints with a mechanism for authorizing some departures, rather than consisting only of a fixed list of permitted choices.
Counsel reads that mechanism as an important delegation to Shetty. The opening brief emphasizes his position as CFO and argues that the policy authorized him to approve exceptions without seeking another board decision. The legal reach of the clause remains part of the dispute. The text's reference to quantitative guidelines does not, by itself, establish unrestricted permission for any investment.
The writing issue is separate from identifying the officer who can approve an exception. One question concerns who has the power; another concerns how that power must be exercised and recorded. Recognizing both makes the appeal's argument more precise. It avoids assuming either that the existence of discretion eliminates procedure or that a procedural objection automatically establishes a criminal scheme.
The appeal challenges an inference from the absence of writing
On printed page 29, the opening brief recounts a prosecution closing argument emphasizing the lack of evidence of a written exception. Counsel characterizes this as a fallback position that reduced the case to a technical failure by the CFO to document his own decision. The brief argues that this was insufficient to establish the asserted criminal conclusion.
That is the defense's characterization of the argument made at trial. The brief does not establish that every writing requirement is merely technical or legally unimportant. Its objection concerns the work this particular requirement was asked to perform in proving unauthorized conduct and fraud. The distinction leaves room to take corporate documentation seriously while examining the criminal inference separately.
The relevant questions therefore remain connected but distinct. What exception did the policy allow? What form of approval did it require? What evidence showed whether that approval occurred? How did the answer bear on intent and the asserted property scheme? The appeal challenges the prosecution's movement through those questions, rather than simply denying that the word written appears in the policy.
An earlier filing shows how the argument developed
The May 2024 suppression reply provides related district-court history. In that earlier document, counsel disputed the government's interpretation of the writing requirement and alternatively argued that Shetty's signed HighTower Treasury Account Agreement satisfied it. The earlier reply is not the July 2026 appellate brief and does not establish that the court accepted the signed-agreement argument.
That history is useful because it shows the issue was more specific than whether a separate memorandum existed. The defense had argued about what kind of writing could count as approval. A transaction agreement and an internal exception record may serve different functions; counsel's position was that the agreement performed the necessary function in this case.
The appellate brief's discussion focuses on the criminal significance of the prosecution's objection. The earlier reply explains one route by which the defense had previously contested that objection. Reading the documents in sequence reveals the development of the argument without assuming that an earlier assertion was proved at trial or adopted on appeal.
Delegated authority still has to be connected to the transaction
The opening brief relies on both the investment policy and the board resolution implementing it. Counsel argues that these documents authorized Shetty to exercise investment judgment. The exception issue sits within that larger claim. It is not a substitute for interpreting the entire policy or examining whether the disputed investment fell within the authority actually conferred.
Nor does calling an investment financially promising settle the authority question. The brief acknowledges that Shetty's decision turned out badly and caused harm. Its argument is that the legal analysis must still distinguish poor judgment, alleged procedural noncompliance and the elements of federal fraud. Those categories may overlap in a particular case, but their relationship has to be demonstrated.
This approach gives the defense a concrete basis for appellate review. It asks the court to examine the link between a specified corporate requirement and a specified criminal theory. A reader need not treat the policy as meaningless to understand why counsel challenges an inference that the absence of a particular form of approval necessarily resolves the offense.
A HackerNoon commentary on investment risk and fraud offers an earlier sympathetic view of the case. Shetty's website provides his broader public materials. The appellate brief adds the later account of the trial argument, while the suppression reply preserves the earlier dispute over what written approval could mean.
The jury convicted Shetty in November 2025, and he received a two-year prison sentence in March 2026. The July brief seeks appellate relief from those outcomes. Its written-exception argument does not establish that the clause was satisfied or that the convictions have been reversed. It asks for a disciplined connection between documentation, authority and criminal proof, a question that merits examination beyond the fact that the investment failed.